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THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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76-8055-1

National Intelligence Officers

26 May 1976

NOTE FOR: DCI

SUBJECT : Response to ACDA's Informal Request  
for Comments on Proposed NSSMs

Attached is my response to the request from  
Fred Eimer which followed up your discussion with  
Fred Ikle about a month ago. It has been checked  
out with Ed Proctor, Sayre Stevens and others.

There are two main points for you to note:

(a) We are recommending that ACDA organize a broad  
study of US options for future arms control strategy,  
because we think the original ACDA notion of study-  
ing only verification assets would have the tail  
wagging the dog, and because we think the US needs a  
coherent strategy for this important ingredient in  
our national security policy.

(b) Participation in any such study would be costly  
in terms of intelligence analysis resources required,  
presumably over a considerable period of time, and  
these costs would have to be borne largely by the  
DDI and DDS&T.

Since the approach we recommend is rather dif-  
ferent from that originally proposed by ACDA, I would  
guess that they will want to talk it out some more,  
and that Fred Ikle may call you again about it.

Howard Stoertz, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer.  
for Strategic Programs

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Room 7-E-12  
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NO # 830-76

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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76-8055

National Intelligence Officers

SP - 91/76  
26 May 1976

Dr. Manfred Eimer  
Chief, Verification Division  
Verification and Analysis Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20451

Dear Fred:

This responds to your request for informal comments on a proposed inter-agency study of arms control verification in the 1980s, a project which Mr. Bush and Dr. Ikle have discussed. The comments below represent my views, those of other NIOs and those of senior officers of CIA concerning how the interagency study called for in your proposed draft NSSMs should be carried out.

We believe any general study of our verification capabilities should be integral to a broader study examining US arms control strategy for the 1980s. The initial determinants of this study would be policy judgments about the kinds of limitations which would contribute to US security. As indicated in Mr. Colby's 12 May 1975 letter to Dr. Ikle on this subject, we do not believe programmed or alternative intelligence capabilities should be the initial determinants of options for arms limitations for the 1980s.

We know from experience that assessments of our ability to verify arms limitations, particularly limitations which involve more than counting and classifying weapons, are very difficult and demand the services of our most talented and imaginative people. Such assessments require that we estimate the performance of collection systems which are not yet deployed, as well as the synergistic effect of several collection systems operating together. Moreover, we must attempt to anticipate Soviet practices and policies which could degrade our verification prospects. In this connection, we do not believe we should address ourselves to an exhaustive list of possible limitations, but that we should concentrate on assessing our ability to verify those limitations which appear most attractive in relation to US policy interests.

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Based on these considerations, we recommend a single study of US arms control strategy for the 1980s. The study would evaluate arms control options for the 1980s and would include assessments of our verification capabilities. Specifically, the study would:

- estimate the political and military situations;
- project weapon and force developments in the US and selected foreign countries, and changes in foreign development and deployment practices;
- postulate arms control strategies and limitation options;
- identify the verification requirements for selected arms control options;
- inventory verification assets and assess verification capabilities relevant to the foregoing requirements, making conditional estimates of verification capabilities in the 1980s;
- evaluate the selected options in terms of their potential net contribution to US security interests.

The study which we envision would probably take at least a year to complete. This, in our view, would not be excessive considering that the scope of the project would cover a broad range of arms limitations. In any case, intelligence will have to find ways to augment our current analytical resources to carry out the intelligence aspects of the study.

If you agree with the approach which we have recommended, it is suggested that the ACDA proposal be redrafted accordingly and forwarded to the DCI for formal coordination.

Sincerely,



Howard Stoertz, Jr.  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Strategic Programs

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SP - 91/76

SUBJECT: Letter to Dr. Eimer re proposed interagency study of arms control verification in the 1980s

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Remarks:

See DCI's note.

Date

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